Abstract: Zero-Knowledge Proofs ZKP provide a reliable option to verify that a claim is true without giving detailed information other than the answer. A classical example is provided by the ZKP based in the Graph Isomorphism problem (GI), where a prover must convince the verifier that he knows an isomorphism between two isomorphic graphs without publishing the bijection. We design a novel ZKP exploiting the NP-hard problem of finding the algebraic ideal of a multivariate polynomial set, and consequently resistant to quantum computer attacks. Since this polynomial set is obtained considering instances of GI, we guarantee that the protocol is at least as secure as the GI based protocol.
Introduction

10
First presented in [1] by Goldwasser, Micali and Rackoff, interactive proof systems are introduced 11 as a method that allows an entity (the prover) to prove the truth of a proposition to a second party (the 
49
The method we define in this work produces key pairs from an associated isomorphism between 50 a pair of graphs. The public key will consist of a system of polynomial equations. The private key will 51 consist of a solution to this system. We will show that finding this solution is at least as difficult as 52 finding an isomorphism between the associated graphs. At present, the fastest algorithm for solving 53 the GI problem runs in quasi-polynomial time [13] , but an authentic prover will be able to provide a 54 solution efficiently.
55
The general layout of this paper is as follows. In Section 2 some basic concepts as well as notation 56 necessary for the development of the zero-knowledge proof is introduced. Next, Section 3 is appointed 57 to the construction of the polynomial sets arising from the GI problem as a reduction exercise. The 58 construction of the ZKP will be explained in 4. Finally, in Section 5 we exhibit evidence supporting the 59 viability of the algorithm by estimating the theoretic complexity of the polynomial set construction. 
Mathematical Background
61
We recall the basic concepts needed to develop the translation from instances of the GI problem 62 in instances of the MQ problem. 
Graphs
64
A graph consists of a set V = {v 1 , . . . , v n }, the vertices and a subset E of V (2) = {e ⊂ V| #e = 2}, isomorphic and we denote it G ≈ H. Thus, we can define the GI problem as the task of finding one of 75 the possibly many isomorphisms between G and H or deciding that this bijection does not exist.
76
Finally, we define a matching as a subset M ⊆ E where no to edges e 1 , e 2 ∈ M share a common 77 vertex. If every vertex of G is an extreme of some edge in M, then the matching is perfect. 
Polynomial Idelas and Algebraic Sets
79
Let F q be the finite field of q elements and R the ring of polynomials in n variables over F q . An 80 ideal is a subset I ⊂ R such that for every f , g ∈ I the sum f + g ∈ I and for every f ∈ I, h ∈ R the 81 product h f ∈ I. Then by considering a finite set F = { f 1 , . . . , f m } ⊂ R we can define the ideal generated 82 by F as follows
It can be seen without too much effort that a common root for the polynomials f i , i = 1, . . . , m is 84 also a root for any f ∈ F . The zero-set of the ideal I consists of all the points (x 1 , . . . , 
95
Solution: Either a proof that V I (F q ) = ∅ or a point x ∈ F n q such that x ∈ V I (F q ). 
135
We can identify any perfect matching M built in this way with a bijection φ that defines the isomorphism of graphs. From a set-theoretic point of view, φ is treated as a collection of pairs being their first coordinate elements that belong to the domain of the function, while the second ones belong to the co-domain [17] . Conditions (i) and (ii) aforementioned constitute an alternative way to assert:
We illustrate what we just explained in figure 1.
(a) An isomorphism between G and H can be seen as a perfect matching in the graph K U,V , preserving adjacencies between G and H.
(b) The edges u 2 v 2 and u 3 v 4 cannot belong simultaneously to M because u 2 u 3 ∈ D, but v 2 v 4 / ∈ E. We add the equation X 2,2 X 3,4 = 0 in I. Now, we perform a suitable reduction from an instance of GI to an instance of MQ following 137 the same ideas exposed in reductions of several other problems in graphs to Boolean quadratic polynomials [18, 19] .
First we will consider the set of n 2 variables {X i,k } for i, k = 1, . . . , n. We restrict any possible solution to the binary set {0, 1} by introducing the following polynomials:
Now, the following polynomials are introduced to require that one and only one vertex v i from U is 140 connected to one vertex of V and vice versa. This links solutions to the fact that we have a perfect
Finally, to guarantee that the set of polynomials has a solution related to the chosen isomorphism, we introduce a third set of polynomials:
This completes the construction of the polynomial set related to the given GI instance. 
Zero-Knowledge Protocol
144
We are ready to explain how we use the theory developed in Section 3 to perform the 145 zero-knowledge proof.
146
Let us start by generating a graph G and a random bijection φ of its vertices. We create a second 147 graph H which is isomorphic to G with isomorphism φ. Now let F 1 be the polynomial system resulting 148 from the process of construction shown in Section 3. A solution x 1 for the system F 1 is found by setting 149 X i,k = 1 if u i v k ∈ M and X i,k = 0 otherwise. The polynomial set F 1 will be public and is used as the 150 public key. The private key will be the solution x 1 .
151
Next, we create a second random bijection ψ and the graph K isomorphic to G defined by this 152 isomorphism. We get a chain of isomorphisms as follows:
We apply the same process to generate a second set F 2 of polynomials and find a solution in the exact same way as we did for the first set. We can avoid the process of graph generation by applying the permutation directly into the public system. We note that from the bijection ψ : U → V we can derive a permutation σ ψ of the set {1, . . . , n} defined by σ ψ (i) = k if ψ(u i ) = v k . This creates a mapping of variables by sending X i,k to X i,σ ψ (k) . We write the polynomials of F 2 satisfying condition (3) as system F 2 , which is sent to Bob as a compromise. 3. Once Alice has received b she must answer accordingly:
168
• if b = 0, she sends the solution x 2 of the system F 2 to Bob,
169
• if b = 1, she sends σ. 4. According to the value of b Bob performs the following to authenticate Alice:
171
• if b = 0, he checks whether x 2 is a solution for F 2 or not,
172
• if b = 1, he computes the system F 2 applying σ to F 1 and checks if he obtains the system F 2 . 
Possible attacks 174
We will consider that a malicious entity (Eve) wants to play the role of Alice. Then she can try the 175 following strategy.
176
Eve flips a coin to decide which value b will send Bob as a challenge. If the result is b = 0, then 177 she randomly generates a system F 2 with a known solution for her. Then Eve sends the system F 2 178 and waits for the challenge. If Bob selects b = 0 the Eve is able to provide an answer to the challenge.
179
Otherwise, if b = 1 she will fail to provide the permutation. Now if the result of the flip is b = 1, the 180 she selects a permutation at random to transform the system F1 into F 2 . Now she will have the answer 181 for the challenge if Bob chooses to send b = 1, but she fails if this is not the case.
182
Now we suppose that Eve wants to obtain information about the secret key, so she plays the role 183 of Bob. She can try asking several times and hope that she can get the same set of polynomials twice.
184
The first time she challenges Alicia with r = 0 so she can get the permutation. The second one she 185 sends r = 1 and gets the solution. Applying the inverse permutation to the solution she can get the 186 private key. However, there are n! different elements, and since n! > 2 n this strategy is not a good one, 187 since the running time will be exponential.
188
We can try to solve these problems to break the protocol with more sophisticate tools:
189
• MQ: An efficient polynomial system solver to find a solution for F 1 would break completely the 190 scheme by exhibiting the private key (even a different solution x 1 would work).
191
• Solving the Isomorphism of Polynomials Problem (IP), which consists of finding two affine 192 transformations S 1 , S 2 such that, for two quadratic transformations F, F, we have F = S 2 • F • S 1 .
193
In our case, the variable permutation can be regarded as a special case of IP where S 2 is the 194 identity and S 1 a permutation matrix.
195
• Solving the GI Problem. For this approach we need to retrieve the initial isomorphic graphs from 196 the polynomial set and find an isomorphism.
197
For the time being, there is no quantum algorithm that solves efficiently any of the aforementioned 198 problems.
Computational complexity
200
We analyse the cost of creating the sets of polynomials, which is the main step in the key generation 201 process. For the first and second sets of polynomials given in (1) and (2) we have to consider the pairs 202 (i, k) for i, k ∈ {1, . . . , n}. The asymptotic time complexity for these is O(n 2 ).
203
We include now the polynomials of the form (3). We need also the solution for this system, we 204 complete the construction with these steps:
205
• For every edge u i u j ∈ D, we look for every edge v k v l in the complementary graph H. We add 206 the corresponding polynomials X i,k X j,l to the system.
207
• For every edge v k v l ∈ D, we walk over every edge v k v l in the complement G. We add the 208 corresponding polynomials X i,k X j,l to the system.
209
• With the chosen isomorphism φ : G → H we create the complete bipartite graph K U,V an the
These equations comprise a total number bounded by n 2 e, where e is size of G. Then we can build the 212 complete system in time O(n 2 e), which is polynomial on the order of G. To build the polynomial set, we start with the edges in G and H. For instance, considering
(1, 2) ∈ G and (3, 4) ∈ H, we get the polynomials X 1,2 X 3,4 . Once we walk over all the edges of G in 219 this fashion, we get the polynomials X 1,1 X 2,2 , X 1,1 X 4,2 , X 2,1 X 3,2 , X 3,1 X 4,2 X 1,3 X 2,4 , X 1,3 X 4,4 , X 2,3 X 3,4 ; X 3,3 X 4,4 . Now, by considering the edges G and H, we get another set of 8 polynomials:
221 X 1,1 X 4,3 , X 1,1 X 4,2 , X 2,1 X 3,2 , X 3,1 X 4,2 X 2,1 X 3,3 , X 2,3 X 3,4 , X 2,3 X 3,4 ; X 3,3 X 4,4 . 
